In the Wake of Garrett: State Law Alternatives to the Americans with Disabilities Act by Shelton, Joseph J.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 52 
Issue 3 Spring 2003 Article 9 
4-1-2003 
In the Wake of Garrett: State Law Alternatives to the Americans 
with Disabilities Act 
Joseph J. Shelton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Joseph J. Shelton, In the Wake of Garrett: State Law Alternatives to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 837 (2003). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss3/9 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
JOHN H. FANNING LABOR LAW WRITING
COMPETITION WINNER
IN THE WAKE OF GARRETT: STATE LAW
ALTERNATIVES TO THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT
Joseph J Shelton'
"The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every
individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that
protection. '
I. INTRODUCTION
On May 4, 1776, the General Assembly of the Colony of Rhode Island
formally declared its independence from England.2 Rhode Island's bold,
historic action occurred two months before twelve of the original thirteen
colonies followed suit and created the first free republic in the New
World.3 More than 200 years later, Rhode Islanders, and the rest of the
country, could be forgiven for thinking that they had rid themselves of
the idiosyncrasies and trappings of monarchial rule.
On July 3, 2001, however, a group of protesters gathered at the Rhode
Island State House to object to a series of recent United States Supreme
Court decisions. Collectively, these decisions hold that under the
Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution, state employees
cannot use certain federal anti-discrimination laws to sue an allegedly
discriminating state for damages! Although Rhode Island state law also
prohibits discrimination, the protesters argued that racial minorities and
the disabled are entitled to the wider protections and greater damage
* J.D. Candidate, May 2003, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law. The author would like to thank Professor Roger Hartley, Burt Boltuch, the staff of
the Catholic University Law Review, and his family for their insight and support.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
2. WILLIAM McLOUGHLIN, RHODE ISLAND, A HISTORY 94-95 (1978).
3. Id.
4. Ariel Sabar, Almond Urged To Sign Right-To-Sue Bill, PROVIDENCE J.-BULL.
(R.I.), July 4, 2001, at B1.
5. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla.
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
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remedies available under federal law, and by denying them this right, the
Supreme Court had effectively disenfranchised them.6 To gain these
rights, the protesters demanded that the governor sign a bill waiving the
state's sovereign immunity.7 Bob Cooper, Executive Secretary of the
Governor's Commission on Disabilities, argued that "[s]overeign
immunity dates back to King George 111. "8 Cooper explained: "We're
calling on the governor to declare independence from English common
law and give up the philosophy that the king can do no wrong." 9
The doctrine of sovereign immunity stems from the ancient rule that
the king is infallible. Blackstone noted that the "[k]ing ... is not only
incapable of doing wrong, but even of thinking wrong: he can never
mean to do an improper thing: in him is no folly or weakness."' The
monarchial infallibility expressed by Blackstone is not, however, without
its dissenters." In Great Northern Life Insurance Co. v. Read,'2 Justice
Frankfurter stated: "Whether this immunity is an absolute survival of the
monarchial privilege, or is a manifestation merely of power, or rests on
abstract logical grounds . . . it undoubtedly runs counter to modern
democratic notions of the moral responsibility of the State."' 3  More
recently, dissenting in Seminole Tribe v. Florida,4 Justice Stevens noted
that the concept that the "'[k]ing can do no wrong' has always been
absurd; the bloody path trod by English monarchs both before and after
they reached the throne demonstrated the fictional character of any such
assumption.""
The protest at the Rhode Island State House, which sought a waiver of
the state's sovereign immunity, evidenced a reaction to the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Board of Trustees of the University of
Alabama v. Garrett.6 In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court
ruled that suits against the states to recover money damages under Title I
of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) are precluded by the
Eleventh Amendment. 17 The consequence of Garrett, which is only the
6. Sabar, supra note 4; see also R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-5-7 (2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
36-4-50 (1991).
7. Sabar, supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 239 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765).
11. See discussion infra notes 12-15 and accompanying text.
12. 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
13. Id. at 59 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
14. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
15. Id. at 95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
17. Id.; see also Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-
12117 (2000); U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not
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latest in a line of similar cases, is alarming: approximately 4,826,897 state
employees are now prohibited from pursuing monetary damages against
states for violations of their rights under certain federal civil rights
statutes."' In addition to the ADA, the Court has reached similar
decisions regarding the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)' 9 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) 0 The Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA),21 the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA),22 and
some aspects of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are also in
danger of a similar fate .
Perhaps cognizant that federal statutory rights may be seen as illusory,
the Supreme Court has noted a number of alternatives to private
monetary damage actions that are available to individuals with claims
against a state. The alternatives include: (1) waiver of sovereign
immunity by the states;2' (2) suits against "lesser entities" that are not
"arm[s] of the state; 2 6 (3) suits brought by the federal government;27 (4)
suits for prospective relief brought against state officials in their official
capacities;2 and (5) suits for damages brought against state officers in
their individual capacities.29
Others have recently explored the efficacy of official capacity suits for
prospective relief, suits against "lesser entities," and suits brought by the
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one
of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.").
18. A Few States Consider Bills Waiving Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, 37 FAIR EMP.
NEWSL. 926 (2001) (quoting 1999 U.S. Census Bureau statistics).
19. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); see also Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938,29 U.S.C. § 201 (2000).
20. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); see also Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 20 U.S.C. § 621 (2000).
21. See, e.g., Hibbs v. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 873 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
granted sub nom. Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 536 U.S. 938 (2002) (mem.)
(discussing the possible immunity of state employers from Family and Medical Leave Act
claims); see also Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
22. Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2000).
23. See Roger C. Hartley, Enforcing Federal Civil Rights Against Public Entities
AfterGarrett, 28 J.C. & U.L. 41, 82-83 (2001) (discussing the potential effect of Garrett on
other federal civil rights legislation).
24. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755-57.
25. See id. at 757-58.
26. Id. at 756.
27. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 n.9 (2001); Alden,
527 U.S. at 759-60; Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996).
28. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 n.9; Alden, 527 U.S. at 756-57; see also Hartley, supra
note 23, at 73.
29. Alden, 527 U.S. at 757; see also Hartley, supra note 23, at 73.
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federal government." Relatively little research, however, has been
conducted concerning the number of states that have voluntarily waived
their sovereign immunity and the effectiveness of these waivers to secure
monetary damage actions. Similarly, comparatively little scholarship has
explored the effectiveness of remedies provided to individuals under
state disability statutes and whether such state law remedies might
constitute an efficacious alternative to suits under the ADA. This
Article will focus on both of these issues. To fully appreciate the
magnitude of these issues, it is important to understand the concept of
sovereign immunity as well as the sources of congressional authority to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S SECTION FIVE JURISPRUDENCE
It is well established that Congress possesses authority to abrogate
state judicial immunity "when it both unequivocally intends to do so and
'act[s] pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.' 3.
Accordingly, congressional legislation passed in accordance with this
authority is enforceable against the states. Previously, Congress has
been understood to possess two valid grants of constitutional authority:
(1) Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) the Commerce
Clause.33 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "[t]he
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article. 34 The Supreme Court has interpreted this
enforcement power "both to remedy and to deter violation of rights
guaranteed thereunder by prohibiting a somewhat broader swath of
conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden by the Amendment's
text."3  The Commerce Clause, on the other hand, provides that
Congress has the power "[t]o regulate commerce ... among the several
states."36 In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,3 7 a plurality of the Supreme
Court held that the Commerce Clause granted Congress the power to
abrogate state sovereign immunity.38
30. See Michael H. Gottesman, Disability, Federalism, and a Court with an Eccentric
Mission, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 101 (2001); Roger C. Hartley, The Alden Trilogy.- Praise and
Protest, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 324, 367-92 (2000); Hartley, supra note 23, at 82.
31. Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 (citation omitted).
32. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 73 (2000).
33. Hartley, supra note 23, at 45; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST.
art. 1, § 8.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
35. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81.
36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
37. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
38. 1d. at 19, 23.
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A number of recent Supreme Court decisions have turned this
traditional understanding of Congress' constitutional authority to
abrogate state sovereign immunity on its head.39  Collectively, these
decisions stand for the proposition that, in the absence of Congress
having validly abrogated state sovereign immunity, individuals seeking to
vindicate their federal statutory rights through monetary damage actions
against a state are precluded from doing so in state court; they are also
precluded from suing in federal court.40 This line of cases raises the
specter of state employees continuing to possess federal statutory rights,
while lacking a judicial forum to vindicate those rights through suits for
monetary damages.4'
In Seminole Tribe,42 the Supreme Court rejected the Commerce
Clause as a source of abrogation authority, thereby expressly overruling
its earlier decision in Union Gas."3 At issue in Seminole Tribe was a
lawsuit brought by the Seminole Indian Tribe against the state of Florida
under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IRGA).44 The Act permits an
Indian tribe to conduct gaming activities provided that the tribe has
reached a compact with the applicable state.45 The Act further provides
that states have a duty to negotiate in good faith with a tribe toward the
formation of a compact.46 To ensure good faith, the Act authorizes tribes
to bring suit in federal court against a state in order to compel
performance of the state's duty to negotiate in good faith.47
The precise question before the Court in Seminole Tribe was whether
"the Eleventh Amendment prevent[s] Congress from authorizing suits by
Indian tribes against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce
legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause., 48 The
petitioner argued that Congress abrogated the states' sovereign
immunity through the enactment of the IRGA.49  On this point, the
Court agreed, concluding that "Congress has in § 2710(d)(7) provided an
39. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 360 (2001); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999);
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691
(1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 572, 536 (1997); Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 72 (1996).
40. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
41. See Hartley, supra note 30, at 339.
42. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
43. Id. at 72; see also Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 23 (1989).
44. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44; see also 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2000).
45. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (2000).
46. Id. § 2710(d)(3)(A).
47. Id. § 2710(d)(7).
48. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 53.
49. Id at 55.
Catholic University Law Review
'unmistakably clear' statement of its intent to abrogate., 50 The Court
then considered whether the IRGA "was passed pursuant to a
constitutional provision granting Congress the power to abrogate.",
51
Here, the Court concluded that Congress did not have the power under
Article I of the Indian Commerce Clause to abrogate states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity in order to permit suits to enforce rights under
52the IRGA. In reaching its decision, the Court noted that the Eleventh
Amendment restricts Article III judicial power and that Congress cannot
use Article I "to circumvent the constitutional limits placed on federal
jurisdiction."53 Accordingly, the Court's decision left Congress' Section 5
power as the only source of abrogation authority.54
In Alden v. Maine, 5 the Supreme Court addressed whether a group of
state probation officers could sue the state of Maine for money damages
in state court under the FLSA.56 The state probation officers had initially
filed suit against the state of Maine in U.S. District Court.57 The U.S.
District Court, however, dismissed the officers' FLSA suit against the
state of Maine because of the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe." Consequently, the probation officers filed the same action in
state court, which dismissed the suit on the basis of sovereign immunity.
59
The Maine Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision.6 °
Subsequently, the Supreme Court held that Congress may not subject
non-consenting states to private suits for damages in state courts.61 In
reaching its decision, the Court noted that requiring states to defend suits
in their own state courts would be more offensive to the states than
forcing them to defend themselves in federal court, which the Eleventh
Amendment prohibits. Accordingly, as a result of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Seminole Tribe and Alden, and in the absence of a valid
50. Id. at 56.
51. Id. at 59.
52. Id. at 72-73.
53. Id.
54. Id.; see also discussion supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
55. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
56. Id. at 711-12. The Fair Labor Standards Act was enacted pursuant to the
Commerce Clause. Accordingly, as a result of the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole
Tribe, this suit against the state for money damages in federal court was not available. Id
at 712.
57. Id. at 711.




62. Id. at 749.
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exercise of Congress' Section 5 power, state employees are precluded
from bringing suit in state court as well as federal court.
In City of Boerne v. Flores,63 the Court examined the scope of
Congress' Section 5 power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 64 At issue was the constitutionality of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA).65 Congress enacted the
RFRA in an effort to reverse the effects of the Supreme Court's holding
in Employment Division v. Smith,66 where the Supreme Court held that
the Free Exercise Clause did not bar Oregon from prohibiting the
religious use of peyote.67 In Boerne, the Archbishop of San Antonio
brought suit against Boerne, Texas under the RFRA because the city
denied the Archbishop's application for a building permit to enlarge St.
Peter Catholic Church."8 Reversing the Fifth Circuit's decision, the
United States Supreme Court stated that there must be "congruence"
and "proportionality" between the statute and the constitutional injuries
the statute was intended to remedy. 69 At the same time, the Court
acknowledged that legislation preventing or remedying constitutional
violations could fall within the "sweep" of Congress' power.70 This
assertion holds even if, in the process, the legislation prohibits some
conduct that is constitutional. In Boerne, the Court noted that RFRA's
legislative record contained little evidence that the states were engaging
in the type of unconstitutional conduct that the RFRA was enacted to
prevent . Applying the congruence and proportionality test to the
RFRA, however, the Court concluded that "[tlhe stringent test RFRA
demands of state laws reflects a lack of proportionality or congruence
between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved."73
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,74 the Court explored the scope
of the Boerne congruence and proportionality test.75 In Kimel, the issue
concerned Congress' exercise of its Section 5 power to make states
subject to money damages in federal court for violating the Age
63. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
64. Id. at 517.
65. Id. at 511; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000cc (2000).
66. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
67. See id. at 878-90.
68. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 512 (1997); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-
2000cc (2000).
69. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520.
70. Hartley, supra note 30, at 351.
71. Id.
72. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31.
73. Id. at 533.
74. 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
75. Id. at 80-82.
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).76 Applying the Boerne
congruence and proportionality test, the Court held that while the
ADEA "contain[ed] a clear statement of Congress' intent to abrogate
the States' immunity, that abrogation exceeded Congress' authority
[pursuant to] Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."77 According to
the Court, the ADEA was not proportional to the harm the statute was
meant to prevent or remedy." In reaching its decision, the Court noted
that the ADEA's legislative record confirmed that Congress found no
evidence of age discrimination by the states, "much less any
discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional
violation."79
The Court's holding in Kimel marked the first time in over fifty years
that the Court held a civil rights statute unconstitutional."° Perhaps in
recognition of the magnitude of its decision, the majority opinion was
careful to note that its holding did "not signal the end of the line for
employees who find themselves subject to age discrimination at the
hands of their state employers .... State employees are protected by
state age discrimination statutes, and may recover money damages from
their state employers, in almost every State of the Union."81
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. GarretJ2 is the
Supreme Court's most recent case addressing the scope of Congress'
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.83 The petitioner, a registered nurse employed
by the University of Alabama, was diagnosed with breast cancer that
required her to undergo a lumpectomy, radiation treatment, and
chemotherapy. 84 As a result, her medical condition required substantial
leave from work. Upon returning to work, Garrett was informed that
she could no longer work as a director, but that she could return in a
76. Id. at 82-83 (deciding specifically whether state employees could sue states for
money damages for age discrimination by state employers); see also 29 U.S.C. § 630(b)
(2000).
77. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 62.
78. Id. at 83.
79. Id. at 88-91.
80. Ivan E. Bodensteiner & Rosalie B. Levinson, Litigating Age and Disability
Claims Against State and Local Government Employers in the New "Federalism"Era, 22
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 99, 100 (2001) (citing A Major Change in Civil Rights
Litigation, 36 TRIAL 94 (March 2000)).
81. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91 (2000).
82. 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
83. See id. at 363-66.
84. Id. at 362.
85. Id.
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lower-paying position as a nurse manager. 6 Garrett then filed a lawsuit
in U.S. District Court seeking money damages under the ADA.87 At
issue in Garrett was whether state employees could recover money
damages for the state's failure to comply with Title I of the ADA.M The
Court held that under the Eleventh Amendment, state employees may
not sue in federal court to recover money damages under Title I of the
ADA. 8' The Court further noted that the legislative record of the ADA
failed to show a pattern of state discrimination in employment against
persons with disabilities. 90  As a result, the Court concluded that
Congress' "failure to mention states in the legislative findings addressing
discrimination in employment reflects that body's judgment that no
pattern of unconstitutional state action had been documented." 91
In sum, the Court has concluded that Congress failed to abrogate state
sovereign immunity with the RFRA, ADEA, and under Title I of the
ADA. 92 In light of these rulings, a number of civil rights statutes are
presently in danger of sharing a similar fate.93  If, however, the
alternatives proffered by the Court turn out to be as effective as
monetary damage actions, it could be argued that little in the form of
protection of individual civil rights has been lost from this line of cases.
On the other hand, if it turns out that the alternatives suggested by the
Court are significantly less effective than monetary damage actions in
vindicating federal statutory rights, it could be argued that this recent
line of cases has made some federal statutory rights illusory.94
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 360.
89. Id. at 370-72.
90. Id. at 368.
91. Id. at 372.
92. See id.; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999).
93. See discussion supra notes 17-23 and accompanying text.
94. See Roger C. Hartley, The New Federalism and the ADA: State Sovereign
Immunity From Private Damage Suits After Boerne, N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
481, 541 (1998) ("[L]imiting public employees to injunctive relief while permitting private
sector employees to bring damage actions against employers that violate the ADA creates
two classes of covered employees. Each has identical substantive federal rights but the
two classes have decidedly different remedial rights."); see also Rebecca E. Zietlow,
Federalism's Paradox: The Spending Power and Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 141, 211 (2002) (arguing that "[t]o the extent that the Supreme Court's
doctrine of state sovereignty prevents the federal government from bestowing rights on its
citizens... that doctrine threatens one of the core functions of the federal government").
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III. WAIVER BY STATES
States may waive their Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in
state and federal courts.95 In A tascadero State Hospital v. Scanon,96 the
Court stated that the Eleventh Amendment does not provide immunity
when a state waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court.
97
In Atascadero, the plaintiff argued that the state had waived its immunity
through a general waiver found in the state constitution.9" Rejecting this
argument, the Court held that a state's general waiver is not sufficient to
waive the immunity guaranteed by the Eleventh Amendment."
Accordingly, Atascadero stands for the proposition that a state may
waive its immunity only if it does so expressly.90
In addition to determining that general waivers are not sufficient to
abrogate a state's sovereign immunity, the Supreme Court has reached a
similar conclusion concerning the doctrine of constructive waiver) °1 In
College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board,°2 the Court rejected the doctrine of constructive waiver
as a permissible constitutional principle.0 3 In reaching its decision, the
Court stated that "there is little reason to assume actual consent based
upon the State's mere presence in a field subject to congressional
regulation. '"'0°  Moreover, the Court reasoned that "[r]ecognizing a
congressional power to exact constructive waivers of sovereign immunity
through the exercise of Article I powers would ... as a practical matter,
permit Congress to circumvent the antiabrogation holding of Seminole
Tribe.
,,05
95. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (citing Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53
(1944) for the proposition that "[t]he rigors of sovereign immunity are thus 'mitigated by a
sense of justice which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the
sovereign"'); see also U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
96. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
97. Id. at 238.
98. Id. at 240 (citing CAL. CONST. art. III, § 5).
99. Id. at 241.
100. Id.; see also Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 305 (1990)
(stating that explicit waiver is found only when a state specifically and unmistakably
expresses its willingness to be sued in federal court).
101. Under the doctrine of constructive waiver, sovereign immunity was deemed
waived as soon as states engaged in a federally regulated activity. See Parden v. Terminal
Ry. of the Ala. Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (holding that the state of Alabama
waived its sovereign immunity from suit under the Federal Employees Liability Act
(FELA) when it chose to operate an interstate railroad).
102. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
103. Id. at 680; see also Hartley, supra note 30, at 356.
104. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 680.
105. Hartley, supra note 30, at 356 (quoting Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 681-83 (1999)).
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Notwithstanding these limitations, the Court in Alden noted that
"[m]any states, on their own initiative, have enacted statutes consenting
to a wide variety of suits. The rigors of sovereign immunity are thus
'mitigated by a sense of justice which has continually expanded by
consent the suability of the sovereign. '""0'  Recent events, however,
appear to lead to a contrary conclusion.O7
Ironically, following the Supreme Court's decision in Alden, "both
houses of the Maine legislature passed legislation to waive Maine's
sovereign immunity to suits brought by Maine's state employees under
the FLSA;" yet, the waiver legislation was vetoed by Governor Angus
King."' It has been suggested that at least some states have read Alden
as an invitation to adopt a more restrictive approach to the waiver
issue.' ° These actions seem to belie much of the Court's rhetoric
concerning the states' "continuing sense of justice."1 In fact, one scholar
has cautioned that "[u]ntil such a complete evaluation has been
undertaken, it is premature to conclude that '[t]he rigors of sovereign
immunity are thus mitigated by a sense of justice which has continually
expanded by consent the suability of the sovereign."'.. Moreover, "[i]f
anything, the evidence to date contradicts that conclusion.' 1 .
As of March 23, 2002, almost a year after the Supreme Court rendered
its decision in Garrett, and nearly four years since it decided Alden, only
106. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (quoting Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read,
322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944)).-
107. See discussion infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
108. Timothy S. McFadden, Note, The New Age of the Eleventh Amendment" A
Survey of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence and a Review of
Kimel v. Board of Regents, 27 J.C. & U.L. 519, 536 (2000). The article quotes Governor
King's veto statement:
It is not necessary to surrender the State's sovereign immunity in this fashion in
order to afford state employees full and adequate protection. The State is
already subject to the FLSA, and has a long history of compliance with it. The
FLSA is fully enforceable against the State by the United States Department of
Labor, which can bring an enforcement action in federal court. The Maine
Human Rights Act affords state employees the same protections for age
discrimination or other discrimination claims. Sovereign immunity is not a
current bar to Title VII or Americans with Disability Act claims, and state
employees are able to pursue such claims against the state under either federal
law or state law equivalents.
Id.
109. Bodensteiner & Levinson, supra note 80, at 116-17 (citing Virginia v. Luznik, 524
S.E.2d 871 (Va. 2000) for the proposition that some courts have relied on Alden to justify
a restrictive interpretation of the waiver issue).
110. Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 53 (1944); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at
755.
111. Hartley, supra note 30, at 370 (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 755).
112. 1d.
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two states, Minnesota and North Carolina, have waived their sovereign
immunity and consented to be sued in federal court pursuant to federal
civil rights statutes. "13 A bill, however, was recently introduced in the
Illinois House of Representatives that would waive that state's sovereign
immunity under the ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and FLSA."' The Majority
Leader of the Illinois House has indicated that the bill will be amended
to include a provision permitting suits under Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act." 5 Similar efforts have failed in four other states.'
16
It is instructive to explore the reasoning of lawmakers who either
support or oppose enacting state waiver statutes to understand the
competing interests at work. These competing interests often make
reliance on voluntary waivers to vindicate federal statutory rights an
unrealistic "alternative." In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in
Garrett, New York legislators introduced bill A. 5971, which waived the
state's sovereign immunity to liability for ADA violations. ' 7 The bill
contained a "justification" clause noting that the Court's decision in
Garrett "effectively took away protection for state workers under the
ADA while upholding the same protection for privately employed
individuals, creating a disparity."'"8 Sponsors of the recently introduced
waiver legislation in the Illinois House of Representatives similarly
reasoned that "[r]ecent Supreme Court decisions have really turned state
employees into second-class citizens. '"" 9 Even the title of the North
Carolina waiver statute, "The State Employee Federal Remedy
Restoration Act,"'2° demonstrates a belief that the federal statutory civil
rights of state employees have been diminished.
Conversely, in his veto message rejecting Rhode Island's proposed
waiver bill, Governor Lincoln Almond argued that submitting the state
to federal damage actions in state court "undermines our state's
113. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1.05 (West 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.35 (2002).
114. H.B. 3772, 92nd Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (I11. 2002) (failed in the Senate Rules
Committee); see also Sovereign Immunity Illinois Legislators Introduce Bill To Waive
Immunity From State Employee Bias Suits, 40 GOV'T EMPL. REL. REP. 133 (BNA) (Feb.
5, 2002) [hereinafter Sovereign Immunity].
115. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 114, at 133.
116. A.B. 5971, 224th Annual Legislative Sess. (N.Y. 2001) (died in Senate 1/9/02);
H.B. 915, 91st Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2001) (died in Senate); S.B. 1196, 2001-2002
Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2001) (vetoed by Gov. Davis); H.B. 5815, 2001-2002 Legislative Sess. (R.I.
2001) (vetoed by Gov. Almond); S.B. 262, 2001-2002 Legislative Sess. (R.I. 2001) (vetoed
by Gov. Almond).
117. A.B. 5971, 224th Annual Legislative Sess. (N.Y. 2001).
118. Id.
119. Sovereign Immunity, supra note 114, at 133 (quoting Mary Dixon, a lobbyist for
the American Civil Liberties Union).
120. State Employee Federal Remedy Restoration Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.35
(2002).
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sovereignty, disrespects our state courts and juries and the legislative
process, and could expose Rhode Island taxpayers to unlimited money
damages under laws not our own.' ' 121 Nevertheless, where the legislative
and executive branches of New York, Missouri, California, and Rhode
Island have failed to find common ground to correct the "disparity"
created by Garrett and its progeny, Minnesota and North Carolina have
succeeded.
22
A. Minnesota -Minnesota Statute § 1.05
Minnesota was the first state to take action in the wake of the Supreme
Court's decision in Garrett.123 On May 22, 2001, Minnesota Governor
Jesse Ventura signed into law a bill designed to undo the damage of
Garrett.24 The law provides:
An employee, former employee, or prospective employee of the
state who is aggrieved by the state's violation of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990[, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, or
Family and Medical Leave Act,] may bring a civil action against
the state in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or
equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of 
the act s]. 25
As a result of the law, Minnesota state employees, unlike their
counterparts in forty-eight other states, have the right to sue the state for
violations of the ADA, ADEA, FLSA, and FMLA in state or federal
court.
126
B. North Carolina - The State Employee Federal Remedy
Restoration Act
27
North Carolina is the only other state to have waived its sovereign
immunity to suit under selected federal civil rights statutes. 28 The State
121. Several States Respond to Garrett Decision, Consider Waiving Immunity to
ADA Lawsuits, 70 U.S. L. WKLY. 2003, 2004 (BNA) (July 3, 2001) (quoting Governor
Lincoln Almond's veto message to Rhode Island House Bill 01-H 5815).
122. See discussion supra note 116 and accompanying text.
123. A Few States Consider Bills Waiving Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, supra note 18,
at 926.
124. Id.
125. MINN. STAT. § 1.05 (2002).
126. See A Few States Consider Bills Waiving Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, supra note
18, at 926. This assumes, of course, that the phrase "any court of competent jurisdiction"
constitutes a clear and unambiguous waiver of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity
as required by cases such as Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
See discussion supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
127. State Employee Federal Remedy Restoration Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.35
(2002).
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Employee Federal Remedy Restoration Act restores the remedial
scheme offered under the ADA, ADEA, FMLA, and FLSA to North
Carolina's state employees.2 9 Like Minnesota's waiver statute, the North
Carolina Act permits state employees to sue in state and federal court. "0
C Summary
With only two states having waived their sovereign immunity under
the ADA, state waiver statutes cannot be relied upon to fill the vacuum
left by the Court's decisions in Garrett and Kimel. While Minnesota and
North Carolina are to be commended, their waivers have created a
disparity among employees in other states. For example, in Minnesota
and North Carolina, state employees enjoy a choice of remedies for
violations of certain federal civil rights statutes, some of which are
unavailable to state employees in forty-eight other states. Similarly,
except in Minnesota and North Carolina, private sector employees enjoy
a level of protection greater than public employees. This disparity can
only be justified if state laws guarantee adequate alternative relief.
Margaret A. McCann, Associate General Counsel of the AFL-CIO, has
argued that "[t]he key is monetary damages. A remedy such as a cease
and desist order doesn't affect the employer economically and doesn't
act as deterrent.'' In essence, state employees in the remaining forty-
eight states are denied full federal legal rights and adequate alternative
relief under state law. The states' limited response in voluntarily
enacting waiver statutes has done little to mitigate the rigors of sovereign
immunity unless the record demonstrates that state law has filled the
void.
128. See infra notes 129, 130 and accompanying text.
129. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.35 (2002). The statute provides:
The sovereign immunity of the State is waived for the limited purpose of
allowing State employees, except for those in exempt policy-making positions ...
to maintain lawsuits in State and federal courts and obtain and satisfy judgments
against the State or any of its departments, institutions, or agencies under:
(1) The Fair Labor Standards Act
(2) The Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(3) The Family and Medical Leave Act
(4) The Americans with Disabilities Act.
Id (citations omitted).
130. Id. In addition, like the Civil Rights Act of 1991, damages are capped at $300,000
for employers with more than 500 employees. See id. §§ 143-299.2, 143-300.35. Thus,
plaintiffs bringing suit under the North Carolina waiver statute will continue to operate
under the same damage caps operating in the ADA. See id. § 143-300.35.
131. See Minnesota Responds to Garrett Decision, Other States Consider Waiving
Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, 167 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 233, 234 (June 25, 2001).
[Vol. 52:837
2003] State Law Alternatives to the Americans With Disabilities Act 851
IV. STATE DISABILITY STATUTES
Before it can be said that state disability statutes offer an effective
alternative to private damage actions against states, a thorough state-by-
state analysis is required. In Garrett, the Supreme Court suggested that
disabled state employees could turn to state discrimination laws for
protection. The Court stated: "It is worth noting that by the time that
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, every State in the Union had
enacted such measures."'32 Likewise, in Kimel, Justice O'Connor noted:
"State employees are protected by state age discrimination statutes, and
may recover money damages from their state employers, in almost every
State.""'
The coverage offered by state disability statutes has been characterized
as "highly varied, often uncertain, and inadequately enforced," and the
protection provided has been described as "potluck., 13 4  Some state
statutes provide substantive protections greater than those provided by
the ADA.' For example, California'36 and Massachusetts 137 require that
one's status of being disabled under state law be considered without
mitigating measures."' Conversely, several states offer much lessprotetion..41
protection than the ADA.'39  Alabama' 4° and MiSSissippi cover only
physical conditions, leaving a large gap in coverage for those suffering
from mental illnesses and disabilities.14 ' This "potluck" characteristic of
state statutory schemes - combined with Congress' finding that
132. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 368 n.5 (2001).
133. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91 (2000) (citing statutory provisions
from forty-seven states).
134. Stephen D. Erf, Potluck Protection for Handicapped Discriminatees: The Need
To Amend Title VII To Prohibit Discrimination on the Basis of Disability, 8 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 814, 844 (1977).
135. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
136. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12940(a) (West Supp. 2002).
137. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151b, §4(16) (West 2001); see also Dahill v. Police
Dep't of Boston, 748 N.E.2d 956, 963 (Mass. 2001) (concluding that corrective devices
should not be considered in determining whether an individual has a handicap within the
meaning of the Massachusetts Fair Employment Act).
138. Contra Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 475 (1999). The Supreme Court
held that under the Americans with Disabilities Act, an individual's impairment is to be
assessed by taking into consideration the effects of any mitigating measures that the
person employs or is taking, including medications. Id.
139. See discussion supra notes 124-26.
140. ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 670-x-4.01 (2002).
141. MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-6-15 (1999).
142. Contra 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000) (defining disability to include any "physical or
mental impairment that substantially impairs a major life activity, a record of such
impairment, or being regarded as having such impairment."); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 41-
1461(4) (West Supp. 2002) (defining disability as a "mental or physical impairment").
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"discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue[s] to be a
serious and pervasive problem" '43 - moved Congress to enact the
ADA. 
144
The ADA's remedial scheme incorporates the remedies available
under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.145 These remedies include injunctive
relief, reinstatement, backpay, and attorneys' fees and costs.'
46
Compensatory and punitive damages may also be awarded where the
employer has engaged in unlawful or intentional discrimination. 47 In
contrast, states' enforcement mechanisms often fall well below the
protection offered by the ADA. 148 Increased reliance on state disability
statutory schemes raises additional problems for state employees that
might not exist if federal monetary damages were available. 149  In
addition, few enforcement options are available to a person who has
suffered discrimination by the state judiciary in its role as employer.5
For example, under Pennsylvania state law, a victim of such disability-
based discrimination is without remedy.' 5'
A. Private Right of Action
The state is considered a covered employer under every state disability
statute in the nation. Despite their collective status as covered
employers, states may be considered exempt from certain aspects of state
statutes. 1 2 In particular, the remedies available to a state employee whohas suffered discrimination on the basis of disability are often more
143. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (2000).
144. See discussion infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
145. JONATHAN MOOK, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT: PUBLIC
ACCOMMODATIONS AND COMMERCIAL FACILITIES § 6.02(4) (2003).
146. Id.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a)(b)(1) (2000).
148. See discussion supra notes 134-44 and infra notes 152-63.
149. See discussion supra notes 145-47.
150. See infra note 15 1.
151. First Judicial Dist. of Pa. v. Pa. Human Relations Comm'n, 727 A.2d 1110, 1112
(Pa. 1999). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that the Human Relations
Commission has no jurisdiction to adjudicate complaints against the judicial branch. Id.
152. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1481(D) (West Supp. 2002) (establishing that
the division may bring a civil action, other than one against the state); ARK. CODE ANN. §
16-123-107 (Supp. 2001) (establishing that the state disability statute is not applicable to
the state); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.320 (West 2002) (providing that in any case
where the commission issues an order against any political or civil subdivision of the state,
the commission shall transmit a copy of the order to the governor of the state). The
Washington statute also requires the governor to take such action to secure compliance
with such order as the governor deems necessary. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.320
(West 2002); see also accompanying appendix.
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limited than the remedies available to a private sector employee. 53 For
example, Arizona's Civil Rights Act covers state and other public
employers.5 4 The state, however, is immune from suit in state court.
55
Thus, Arizona state employees are precluded from vindicating their
state-based disability rights in state court.'
56
Even where the state is not exempt from any provision in the statute,
157state employees still are not guaranteed a judicial forum. In fact, many
state disability statutes fail to provide those who have suffered
discrimination with a private right of action altogether.' Conversely,
under the ADA, an individual discriminated against because of a
disability has a private right of action in federal court after exhausting
the administrative remedies provided by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.159  In sixteen states, individuals who have
suffered discrimination because of their disabilities are precluded from
bringing a private right of action under their state disability statutes.'
6°
This leaves limited review of state administrative action as the only
possibility for access to judicial review.16 Thus, notwithstanding the fact
that states may be covered "employers" in these sixteen states, state
employees are still not permitted to sue their employers because there is
153. See discussion infra notes 164-84 and accompanying text.
154. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1461.2 (West 1999).
155. Id. § 41-1481(D).
156. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.11(5) (West 1997) (stating that the "state and
its agencies and subdivisions shall not be liable for punitive damages"); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 5, § 5-4613(2)(B)(8)(i) (West 2002) (finding that no punitive damages are
permitted against a governmental entity or against an employee of a governmental entity
if within scope of employment); accompanying appendix.
157. See discussion infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
158. See discussion infra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
159. See Maynard v. Pneumatic Products Corp., 256 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001);
Bonilla v. Alvarez, 194 F.3d 275, 278 (1st Cir. 1999).
160. Private lawsuits are precluded in Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Maryland, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Mexico, Utah, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. See accompanying appendix.
161. The typical standard of judicial review of state administrative action is the
substantial evidence standard, not de novo review of law or fact. See Md. Human'
Relations Comm'n v. Mayor and City Council of Bait., 586 A.2d 37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1991) (finding that decisions of the Maryland Commission on Human Relations will be
upheld where they are based upon substantial evidence); Morris Mem'l Nursing Home v.
W. Va. Human Rights Comm'n, 431 S.E.2d 353, 355 (W. Va. 1993) (recognizing that the
respondent may appeal an order of the Human Rights Commission to the state Supreme
Court and that a finding of discrimination will be upheld if supported by substantial
evidence based on the record as a whole); Kamen v. Rosa, 636 N.Y.S.2d 59, 60 (App. Div.
1996) (clarifying that the scope of judicial review is limited to whether the
"Commissioner's determination is, upon the whole record, supported by substantial
evidence" and that the division's determination is to be accorded substantial deference).
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no private right of action under the state disability statutes.'62 The
concomitant result in these sixteen states is that all access to a judicial
forum, whether it is a state or federal court, is foreclosed for state
employees.'
B. Compensatory Damages
Just as states have impeded discriminatees' access to the courts, they
have also limited the realm of available damages. Compensatory
damages may be obtained under the ADA when an employer engages in
"unlawful intentional discrimination" or violates the provisions
concerning reasonable accommodation.'64 In contrast, disabilitya • 165 166
discrimination statutes in six states - Arizona, ' Arkansas,
7168 169Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Utah, °  and
Wisconsin' - do not provide compensatory damages under any
circumstances. A number of other states have capped damages atS 172
amounts well below that provided under the ADA, including Kansas,
South Carolina,' Washington, 4 and West Virgina. 175 Before Garrett,
state employees in these states were permitted to obtain compensatory
damages under the ADA as an alternative to, or in addition to, their
state statutory remedies. After Garrett, these state employees are faced
with limited caps that provide meager compensatory damages or none at
all.
C Punitive Damages
The ADA provides that punitive damages may be awarded only where
the complaining party demonstrates that the employer engaged in an
162. See discussion supra note 160 and accompanying text.
163. See discussion supra note 160 and accompanying text.
164. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2000).
165. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1481(6) (West 1999) (precluding recovery of
compensatory and punitive damages).
166. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-123-107 (Michie 1987).
167. MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 25-9-131, 25-9-132 (2000).
168. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 168(A)-11(b) (2002).
169. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.4-19 to -21 (1997).
170. UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-35-1 (2001).
171. SeeWIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.31 to .395 (West 2002).
172. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1005(k) (1993) (emotional damages limited to $2,000).
173. S.C. CODE ANN. § 43-33-540 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (actual damages limited to
$5,000).
174. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.60.250(5) (West 2002) (compensatory damages
limited to $10,000).
175. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 5-11-1 to -19 (Michie 1999) (compensatory damages in
administrative proceedings limited to the equivalent of $1,000 in 1977 dollars).
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intentional discriminatory practice "with malice or with reckless
indifference to the federally protected rights" of the person bringing the
claim. 7 6  Conversely, thirty-two states preclude individuals from
recovering punitive damages under their state statutes.'77 Even in those
states that allow for punitive damages against private employers, state
employees seeking punitive damages face significant obstacles. Where
a statute expressly applies to the state as an employer, a number of states
have concluded that the state is nevertheless immune from liability for
punitive damages.79  In Johnson v. State Department of Fish & Game,'
80
the Alaska Supreme Court concluded that although the state was a
covered entity under the statute, the state was immune from liability for
punitive damages in lieu of express statutory authority. 8' Similarly, in
Kline v. City of Kansas City, Fire Department,2 the court refused to
award punitive damages against a municipality under the Missouri
Human Rights Act.183 The court reasoned that punitive damages were
not available because the burden of payment ultimately fell on taxpayers
and thus did not have the requisite deterrent effect.'
8
D. Right to Trial by Jury
In addition to the difficulties state employees may face while seeking
compensatory and punitive damages against the state, state statutory
schemes also dissolve discriminatees' right to a jury trial, which the ADA
provides. In most states, a plaintiff seeking compensatory or punitive
damages against the state is either precluded from doing so or must do so
without the benefit of a trial by jury."' For example, North Carolina's
state disability statute originally provided that a handicapped person
aggrieved by a discriminatory practice may bring a nonjury civil action in
the superior court in the county where the alleged discriminatory
practice occurred or where the plaintiff or defendant resides. 16 As a
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b)(1) (2000); see also MOOK, supra note 145.
177. See accompanying appendix.
178. See discussion infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
179. See discussion infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
180. 836 P.2d 896 (Alaska 1991).
181. Id. at 906.
182. 175 F.3d 660 (8th Cir. 1999).
183. Id. at 670.
184. Id. at 669-70; see also James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Availability and Scope
of Punitive Damages Under State Employment Discrimination Law, 81 A.L.R. 5TH 367,
436 (2000); Curran v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 1997 WL 587371, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(concluding that there is a long-standing Pennsylvania public policy against holding a
government agency liable for punitive damages).
185. See discussion supra notes 164-84 and accompanying appendix.
186. 2001 N.C. Sess. Laws 467, § 3.
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result of the State Employee Federal Remedy Restoration Act, however,
North Carolina state employees seeking compensatory damages against
the state are now entitled to jury trials.17 Conversely, at least nine states
disallow their employees the right to a jury trial when seeking to enforce
their rights under the applicable state disability statute.
8
V. CONCLUSION
Neither the option of a state waiver of Eleventh Amendment rights
nor the states' own anti-discrimination statutes provide an effective
alternative to enforcing the rights of the disabled under the ADA. In
theory, waiver statutes provide state employees with the perfect solution
to restore federal enforcement rights precluded under Garrett and
Kimel. To date, however, only two states have voluntarily waived their
immunity in the wake of Garrett.'9 Moreover, reliance on the remedies
offered under the state disability legislation is highly problematic. '9°
After all, as noted by the National Association of Protection and
Advocacy Systems and United Cerebral Palsy Associations in their briefs
as amici curiae in Garrett, "[i]t is hard to believe . . . that if the [fifty]
state legislatures had adequately addressed the problem of
discrimination against individuals with disabilities, the 'Fifty State
Governors' committees' on whose reports Congress relied would have
concluded that 'existing State laws do not adequately counter such acts of
discrimination.""''  Clearly, Congress intended to apply the ADA to the
states as employers because state coverage was deemed inadequate.
Indeed, although state disability laws may prove to be an effective
alternative for some state employees, the "potluck" nature of the state
statutory disability scheme renders it an ineffective alternative. '9' The
majority of state employees do not enjoy the same level of protection
under their state statutes as that offered by the ADA.'93 Accordingly, it
187. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-300.35 (2002).
188. These states include Arizona, Colorado, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri,
North Carolina, and Pennsylvania. See accompanying appendix.
189. See discussion supra note 113 and accompanying text.
190. See Brief of Amicus Curiae National Association of Protection and Advocacy
Systems and United Cerebral Palsy Ass'ns, Inc., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett,
531 U.S. 356 (2001) (No. 99-1240) (arguing that "[t]here is no reason to think that the state
legislatures will act now to rectify the deficiencies in their laws, given that they have not
done so in the ten years since the ADA was enacted").
191. Id. at 4.
192. See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 47 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303,
329 (stating that "[sitate laws are inadequate to address the pervasive problems of
discrimination that people with disabilities are facing").
193. See id. (noting that "[t]he fifty State Governor's Committees, with whom the
President's Committee on Employment of People with Disabilities works, report that
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is crucial that interested parties organize and lobby their state legislators
to enact statutes analogous to those in Minnesota and North Carolina. In
the alternative, efforts need to be made to strengthen the existing state
disability statutory schemes in order to fill the vacuum created by the
Supreme Court in Garrett and its progeny. The same is true concerning
other federal civil rights statutes, which courts may find to have failed to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The
welfare of 4.8 million state employees depends on it.
existing state laws do not adequately counter acts of discrimination against people with
disabilities").
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